


Aufstieg oder Niedergang: Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter und Postmoderne

Von Bernd F. Schulte

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Von Bernd F. Schulte : Aufstieg oder Niedergang: Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter und Postmoderne before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Aufstieg oder Niedergang: Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter und Postmoderne:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen2 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. John A. Moses, Into the Abyss 1914-1918: How did it Happen? Coming to Grips with Prusso-German Political Culture. Von bert schulzAufstieg oder Niedergang: Deutschland zwischen Mittelalter und Post Moderne By Bernd F. Schulte. (Hamburger Studien zu Geschichte und Zeitgeschehen, Reihe I, Bd. 3 (Abteilung Geschichte und Zeitgeschehen) Hamburg 2008.History Australia: Journal of the Australian Historical Association vol 12, no 1, April 2015. -----The German Tradition of the Political Professor of History.It is very important that books by

German historians are reviewed in this country, especially those that focus on Prusso-German militarism at this time. Understanding the peculiarities of German history (Blackbourn Eley) must be a priority not only for British, French and American historians but also especially for Antipodean scholars. Prior to 1945 most German modern historians believed that they should pursue their discipline to advance the national cause in an age of competing empires. They were frankly political. Understandably, after the end of the Second World War West German universities underwent a massive ideological spring clean supervised by the Anglo-American and French occupying powers. So in time two forms of putative ideological conformity were established either side of the Wall. This meant that the Cold War took on the aspect of an ideological debate over different ways to interpret history, one liberal and the other Marxist-Leninist. This meant that in the West in general that old Liberals, Social Democrats including those of Jewish origin whom the Nazis had persecuted were returned to their professorial chairs. In issue no 62 of this journal Professor Andrew Bonnell published a review article on highly significant recent research on the background to the Great War. This article wishes to complement his contribution with supporting insights derived from examining other relevant works. Consequently, in the West, a pluralist society was established, where social democrats, liberals, conservatives including right-wing apologists flourished, while in the East society became dogmatically and uniformly Marxist-Leninist. What is very interesting is the fact that East and West German professors initially expected to hold conferences together, but this soon proved to be ideologically impossible because those in the East, taking their cue from Walter Ulbricht, reproached their Western counterparts for being NATO Professors so that a promising dialogue between the two separated camps degenerated into ideological trench warfare. Some liberally inclined West German professors, however, were more circumspect and avoided becoming cold war warriors (*kalte Krieger*). One such high profile personality was Professor Waldemar Besson (1929-1971) a traditionally trained historian who was appointed to be the first professor of political science at the University Erlangen 1961-1966). There he was well known for saying that in order to establish where a nation is going you have to know where it has been. His political science was indeed very historically oriented. As one who had been thoroughly educated in German political history (Statism) Waldemar Besson, conceived of history as political pedagogy. This tradition focussed sharply on the life of the nation, the State, how it should be governed and what its future possibilities might be. Besson also declared that the year of the great Nazi defeat, namely 1945 was *das Jahr null in der deutschen Geschichte*, that is zero year in German history. By this he meant that the Nazi era had resulted in a total catastrophe, most particularly for German political values. The 19th century doctrine of the Power State (*Machtstaat*) which was anti-democratic and hostile to Western values had led to an unprecedented disaster. A completely new beginning had to be undertaken intellectually as well as materially. Besson was, of course not alone among the post war German professors who were aware of the urgent need to re-educate the Germans politically and to revive both liberal and social democratic traditions that had been brutally excised from the German intellectual heritage. He together with his colleague, the well known Professor Ralf Dahrendorf, had been enlisted by the then Chancellor Georg Kiesinger, (successor to Konrad Adenauer) to form a think tank for his party, the Christian Democratic Union to advise the Federal government on issues concerning both domestic and foreign policy. Their task as political professors was to point the way to a definitely more liberal future both domestically and with regard to foreign policy. Their political-pedagogic role was clear; a new breed of political professors had been born to steer Germany back into the comity of nations. One had to learn from history. And that meant in particular, to re-focus on the period 1815 to 1848, the so-called Vormärz era when from the time of the Congress of Vienna and the 1848 revolutions in Europe there had been a great movement among both middle class intellectuals and the rising working class demanding that the ideas of 1789 be realised in Germany. That meant an end to petty state particularism that should be replaced by a new federated parliamentary Germany with a constitutional monarch like that of Great Britain. Precisely this doctrine was already being taught at the University of Sydney by its first professor of modern history, namely George Arnold Wood (1865-1928). As an avowed Whig, Professor Wood was convinced of the vocation of the English race to bring peace and prosperity to the world, to liberate subject peoples and to educate the masses to democratic ways as their birthright. Indeed, Wood had hoped most earnestly that the lessons of the Great War would be learned by all belligerents, not only the Germans themselves, and that the nations would settle down to peaceful cooperation instead of continued violent competition. He wrote in 1919: As one reads the events of today one is perforce reminded of the events of 1848: the revolutionary establishment of democracy in all parts of Germany, including Prussia, and the firm resolve to form a German democratic constitution. I believe that genuine democratic forces will once more appear in Germany, and the forces which destroyed German democracy in 1848 do not exist in 1918. But for the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns German democrats would have succeeded in 1848 and they will, I believe, succeed in 1918. Then there are difficulties and dangers in the lands of the Allies, and the democratic and pacifist parties must be ready to face them. Within the limitations of his time Professor Wood had been able to judge the root causes of German aggression very perceptively. He had located the problem in the constitutional structure of the Reich which left executive power in the hands of the ruling houses. Of course, Wood's optimism that the new Weimar Republic had created the conditions for democracy to flourish in Germany was massively misplaced since he could not have imagined at the time what forces were at work that eventually produced such a barbaric movement as that of National Socialism. But Wood's judgement about the flawed Bismarckian

constitution based as it was on militarism was essentially accurate. Its long term consequences for Prusso-Germany, Europe and the wider world were catastrophic. Bismarckian Germany was uniquely militaristic as shall be explained. A new German Professorial Voice: With all the foregoing in mind attention may be focussed on Oliver Janz and his most recent book which surveys the causes of the great European war of 1914. Janz is Professor of Modern German history at the Free University in Berlin-Dahlem, not to be confused with older Humboldt University located in what was East Berlin where it had been under communist control until the Wende of 1989. What Herr Janz has to say and how he says it is indicative of the new voice with which some of the present generation of German historians speak. He is sober and balanced in his judgements, taking pains to be visibly even handed and detached, avoiding any degree of partisanship. Moreover, his narrative investigates the political situation in all the belligerent countries in a praiseworthy attempt to do justice to all. To do this he has in particular evaluated the war-guilt debate unleashed by Fritz Fischer and his school some fifty years ago and which has raged on ever since. Janz assessment of Fritz Fischers historical political pedagogy which began in earnest back in 1961 (*Griff nach der Weltmacht*) is the real starting point of his survey. The war was not plotted years previously as the Fischer school allegedly would have it, but neither did the various nations stumble into the war in a fit of absence of mind (Lloyd George) or like sleepwalkers (Christopher Clark) find themselves on awakening in an inextricable and deadly turmoil. So Janz in taking the middle ground seems to incline to a position on war guilt such as that enunciated early in the Fischer controversy by Golo Mann who characterised all Powers as beasts of prey, each one ready to resort to war if its vital interests were threatened. This seems, indeed, to be very close to Janz position. In his political pedagogy, the Berlin professor is clearly at pains to be scrupulously even handed and he certainly would never claim to have said the last word on this subject. It is fortuitous, though, that his work has appeared in time to balance the interpretation of Christopher Clark in his *Sleepwalkers*, who, as a Cambridge-based Australian historian, seems driven by the desire to exculpate the Kaisers Germany from any degree of guilt. On close inspection it appears that both Clark and Janz have covered the same ground but have come up with significantly different conclusions. Both investigate the policies of all the belligerents but whereas Clark studiously avoids the incriminating aspects of German policy, Janz on the other hand is openly transparent. He does not try to absolve Germany from her secret machinations to force Austria to act against Serbia thus precipitating dire consequences. He does, however, shy back from the position of John Rhl and endorsed by the Fischer school that at the latest by December 1912 (War Council) Germany had decided on eventual aggression for goals that had been germinating in the mind of the power elite for years previously. Indeed, an investigation of the peculiar mentalit of the German power elite is avoided. But surely this is essential if one is to comprehend the slide into the abyss. The fact is there would have been no slide had not the German government insisted that Austria move against Serbia. Once having eliminated the Slav minor power the way to implementing, with Austrian cooperation, German ambitions in the Balkans and beyond to Iran and finally to India would have been cleared. Russia, however, was a problem and here is where Germany gambled on being able to stare down the Eastern Great Power. If not, she believed that she had the means to be able to overcome any opposition from the Tsarist regime, namely the Schlieffen Plan. Bernd Schulte has put forward the most plausible explanation for the crisis which may be summarised as follows: Germany had long term ambitions to become the predominant power in the world. But this was only possible with the collaboration of Austria-Hungary as junior partner. At the time the latter Power had become literally bankrupt. Her fiscal status was catastrophic and appeals to Germany for the necessary loans had no chance of being considered because of Germanys own limited fiscal capacity. But Germany had another way to solve the dilemma, namely by forcing Austria- Hungary to move aggressively against Serbia, advocating war on a buy-now-pay-later basis. The documentary evidence for this conclusion was supplied by the German *chargé d' affaires* in Vienna none other than the German Chancellors own cousin, Dietrich von Bethmann Hollweg and disclosed for the first time by Herr Schulte. This historian has appeared unexpectedly like a mysterious stranger in town of whom one is both afraid to welcome but cannot ignore and whose academic credentials as a former doctoral student of Fritz Fischer are impeccable. Schultes work constitutes a historiographical phenomenon resulting from his facility to gain access to the private archives particularly of First World War German officers. What he has been able to uncover to date, and continues to do, emphasises again and again that the power elite in Germany were so anxious about their continued status in the Reich that they would not shy back from risking all out war to ensure that the Prusso-German social structures remained intact. All this is demonstrated in the numerous documents published by Schulte in his weighty publications. Style and elegance of narration may have been sacrificed in the interests of getting the facts into print but these are devastating and historiographically of crucial importance. Not dissimilar to the findings of John Rhl on the Kaiser and his court , Schulte reveals the values of a peculiarly Prusso-German cast of mind. This is relevant to the image of Great Powers as Beasts of Prey. There is no doubt that each Great Power would resort to war if its status were challenged. In that regard, Leopold von Ranke's 1833 assessment of the Great Powers had not changed. It was an essential characteristic of a Power to strive to expand its influence at the expense of neighbours. But as Ranke saw it they were locked in a mechanism which ensured that they would realign themselves against any one Power which made a move to extend its power unilaterally, namely to exert hegemony. This was the pattern of European history since the Reformation at the latest. Obviously neither the Kaisers Germany nor Hitlers learned the lesson that von Ranke had

once so eloquently taught. With the advent of Otto von Bismarck and his Prussian solution to the German Problem in 1871, a crucially new ideological factor came into play, namely the phenomenon of Borussismus. This was the seductive doctrine that it had been the historic mission of Prussia to unite the other Teutonic principalities under her hegemony. Since Bismarck had succeeded with such clat in accomplishing this, the unification of Germany at that time was a virtual confirmation of the laws of history or the dramatic intervention of the hand of God in the nations affairs resulting in the Prussification of Germany. That meant essentially that Germany had been united by and ruled in the interests of the Prussian-German army. This is something often very difficult for outsiders to take on board but it meant that effectively the new Germany had two constitutions, the one which established the Reichstag, that is a national parliament albeit with very limited prerogatives except the right to vote supply, and another which related to the maintenance and management of the army. This was the so-called Wehrverfassung that effectively made the army a state within the state. This is too easily forgotten but it meant that in war-time the army effectively took over the responsibility of government. And as Schultes numerous publications have shown the self-perception of the army officers was that they were the real power behind the throne. No other group really counted. Of course, the education of the generations of students in Germany since 1871 had ensured that this very illiberal, anti-democratic, anti-parliamentarian mentality was shared and endorsed by the majority of the educated middle and upper classes. If one was too liberal, too Catholic and, God forbid, to any degree socialist, one was not a true German. And this national indoctrination process was both initiated and pursued by history professors of impressive erudition who thereby exerted immense politically-pedagogic influence. Consequently the state within the state ensured that Germany was to march down a separate path to modernity assiduously eschewing the liberalism of the West, the much discussed Sonderweg. The literature on this theme is vast, and astute foreign observers such as the above mentioned George Arnold Wood were already before the First World War very aware of it. What Bernd Schulte has done is to remind his fellow countrymen in chapter and verse that this was so. To ignore it is to write less than honest history. The tap root cause of the Great War was the anxiety of the Prusso-German military elite, the Pan Germans, the captains of industry and commerce, the professoriate encompassing especially historians and Protestant theologians, and all those who were anxious about the inexorable rise of the Social Democrats internally and the burgeoning strength of the other Great Powers externally, especially the Western ones. The very existence of foreign states of successful liberal, parliamentary culture was a permanent threat to the German autocratic monarchies. They lived in a world of ideas more akin to those of Frederick the Great of Prussia in the 18th century. And this was really cemented by the Bismarckian solution to the German question as Johannes Willms in his book, *Bismarck. Dmon der Deutschen: Anmerkungen zu einer Legende* (1997) demonstrates. Dr Schulte brings all this to a point in his research. Here the well known Anglo-German antagonism (Paul Kennedy) is made more comprehensible in the hitherto unexplored correspondence of Prusso-German officers as well as in official memoranda. What is chilling about the self-perception (Selbstverstdnis) of the Pan German, military power elite, is their outlook on the world, their mentalit, especially the ferocity of their anti-British feeling. They projected the image of polar opposites such as Professor Werner Sombart (1863-1941) did in famous his war book of 1915, *Hndler und Helden* (Traders and Heroes) where the English shopkeepers pettifogging spirit (Krmergeist) was contrasted with the noble, cultivated and philosophic spirit of the Germans. The German mind was driven by the most elevated impulses out of which grew the German Sendungsbewusstsein or sense of mission to the world, specifically to bestow upon neighbouring peoples the benefits of a superior Kultur by force if necessary. This is an explanation for German imperialism akin to the earlier work of the Austrian scholar Josef Schumpeter (1883-1950), *The Sociology of Imperialism* (1919) and *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942) in which he spoke of militarism becoming a problem when leading generals influenced political decision-making, and this they surely did in Prussia-Germany, though admittedly the army budget was indeed voted on in the Reichstag but initially only every seven years (Septennat) and later every five years.(Quinquenat). This constitutional provision enabled the military budget to be passed relatively smoothly when the conservative parties combined to ensure a parliamentary majority. And here is the point that many historians, including German, fail to grasp: Germany was a blatantly naked military monarchy with a parliamentary fig leaf. It is relatively easy to see how it opted for war in August 1914 because it suffered from a deep rooted Konzeptionslosigkeit, that is an inability to conceive of alternative political solutions. So much has been written about this since the eruption of the Fischer controversy particularly after the 1964 Berlin Historians Congress when for the very first time Fischer and his school ventured to defend themselves publicly. Their stance at the time became both national and international news. Now his pupil Bernd Schulte continues the historiographical campaign where Fischer and his associates had left off. What Bernd Schulte, by virtue of his archival diligence, has been able do is to highlight those features of Bismarckian and Wilhelmine Germany which distinguished it as a political entity sui generis. In short, it was a very modern country in scientific, industrial, commercial and economical achievements but with regard to political culture was very backward, still cultivating values from the age of absolutism, indeed living in the past. This was politically volatile. Of course, many scholars had already drawn attention to this, including the present writer, but Schulte has brought out in high relief just how strong the influence of very reactionary officers was in the corridors of power in Berlin. One needs to enquire why and how the German educated elite, the Bildungsbrgertum, exerted so much influence on the political

values of the Nation. In their self-perception they comprised the Nation alongside the aristocracy. Das Volk, the lower orders and especially the organised working class, far from being included in the Nation were considered vaterlandslose Gesellen, that is vagabonds without a fatherland, an appellation primarily for the Social Democrats and Trade Unionists. A critical examination of Bismarckian and then Wilhelmine Germany is an essential exercise in explaining the origins of the Great War of 1914-1918. Any attempt such as that made by Christopher Clark in his study, *The Sleepwalkers* that fails to take adequate account of the peculiarity of Wilhelmine society is bound to be misleading. For example, Clark understates the crucial domestic situation in the Reich which made it such an unstable society. Striking was the anxiety among the ruling classes concerning the growing organisational presence of social democracy and trade unionism. It posed for the elites an insoluble problem whereby they tended to forget that Germany's rise to great power status was not solely made possible by the efficiency of the army, the productivity of industry and the brilliance of her scientists. Underpinning all that was the skill and diligence of her workers. The German labour force became in time, after the industrial revolution, the most efficient in the world. This was reflected in the dramatic rise of German commercial shipping which had before the end of the 19th century outstripped that of Britain. How does one explain the fear and indeed the ingratitude of the German bourgeoisie and aristocracy regarding organised labour? In a word, the bargaining power in the work place and the democratic ideology of the working class, wrongly identified as revolutionary, engendered a deep seated anxiety which was called *die Arbeiterfrage*, the labour question or labour problem. This is at the heart of the matter. Bismarck had tried to solve the problem by banning the Social Democratic Party and socialist trade unions from 1878 to 1890 on the ground that they were subversive. The fact that his anti-socialist legislation (*Sozialistengesetz*) was not renewed in 1890, the year in which the Kaiser virtually dismissed the old Reich Chancellor, was not, of course, due to any change of heart by the ruling classes and their Reichstag representatives; rather it was because they could not agree to what extent it should be made even more draconic, and so it lapsed. The consequence was that subsequent governments continued to wonder how to take the sting out of the socialist movement such as making strikes illegal as the attempts in 1894 (*Umsturzvorlage*) and 1898 (anti-strike legislation) both of which failed. The point is that in the decade after Bismarck's fall the organised working class became an increasingly greater problem for the German bourgeoisie and aristocracy. Baffled by the Labour Question they had no idea of how to integrate that element of society on which the industrial and commercial strength of the Reich actually rested. There prevailed a perennial *Konzeptionslosigkeit*. When one comprehends this domestic political dilemma, understanding what ailed Prusso-Germany is no longer difficult. No one in power, either in the bureaucracy or in the army, in industry or commerce, had a solution beyond demanding the entire population's submission to a monarchical-militaristic system. Germany was far from being a socially unified country. This needs to be understood by anyone who seeks to explain why Prusso-Germany chose war in August 1914. But this was only one advantage which the ruling classes and their bourgeois supporters promised themselves. The other was imperial expansion on a vast scale. Why? Because the Hegelian world spirit called them to it. The Kaiserreich had an ideology comparable to that of Marxism-Leninism that was behind Soviet imperialism. One may call it *Wilhelminism*. This meant maintenance of the monarchical-military constitution, permanent restraint on the demands of organised labour domestically and the expansion of German imperial objectives abroad. The result was a society profoundly polarised while externally, relations with the other Great Powers, especially France and Britain deteriorated. The descent into the abyss of the Great War was a process that obviously attracts many historians to offer explanations. Why did the lamps go out all over Europe as Sir Edward Grey observed from his office window in London on the evening of 3rd August 1914? The answer that Bernd Schulte provides, following Fritz Fischer, Imanuel Geiss and John Rhl, is that the main switch was located in Berlin and was being controlled by anxious and ambitious men labouring under delusions of ultimate world power. From what has been said it should not be difficult to grasp that the international situation in August 1914 left the Pacific dominions with little choice but to declare war on imperial Germany. The suggestion that the great European war of 1914-1918 was none of Australia's business can only come from persons who have not yet appreciated the nature and extent of German war aims. A key example is provided in the latest issue of the journal of the Australian Historical Association *History Australia*. This features the farewell address of the outgoing president professor Marilyn Lake. It was held at the AHA Conference at the University of Queensland 7-11 July 2014 and is a challenge to all thinking citizens because the author proposes in effect an alternative path for Australian national history, that is one which she advocates energetically and which is very different from the one actually taken by our political leaders at the time. The judgement is that they, presumably under pressure from imperial masters in Whitehall, took the wrong decisions that led the nation into an eminently avoidable catastrophe. The imperial connection was, in short, an outworn anachronism. And there were eloquent advocates such as Henry Bourne Higgins and others who were, well before the Great War, offering alternative constitutional arrangements that would have made Australia into a miniature version of the great United States of America, in short an independent republic in the South Seas. This is not history how it essentially was (Ranke) but rather history as one would have preferred it to have been; that is history that conforms to the aspirations of some disappointed citizens at the present time. What Professor Lake and her supporters advocate is a re-writing of Australian history to advance their preferred present-day political agenda, the fallacy of the well known phenomenon of presentism. A good example is what happened to history in

fascist and communist countries of dreaded memory where the history profession was instructed by the State to write and teach history to justify the policies of the current dictatorship. Consequently, once in power, totalitarian regimes of every colour, prioritise the imposition of their version of the nations development on the students as the only truth. No other versions are tolerated. The difficulty here, of course, is that movements, personalities and ideas that ran counter to the aims of the ruling party were literally air- brushed out of the national narrative and their advocates gulaged. What the truth was is decided by the party in power. Thereby history became an indispensable instrument of totalitarian political pedagogy. In the case of fascist and communist countries it was an ideological weapon, indeed presentism in its most brutal form because to voice an alternative view was to incur the direst penalties. Happily, in Australia and in the West generally, varieties of historical interpretations are freely available. Indeed it is the key characteristic of any democratic society that the market place of ideas and values is open to advocates of all ideologies, provided they are not criminal. Consequently, one can only welcome such interpretations as Professor Lake advances about Australias involvement in the Great War; they affirm that this country is positively and irrevocably committed to ideological tolerance. There prevails here an open speech situation (Jrgen Habermas) which is the indispensable feature of any democracy. All views expressed are debateable. It is, therefore, the contention of this journal that vigorous debate is indispensable to the health of the national community. The sad part is that there are always those who seem to prefer the old German adage: Und willst Du nicht mein Bruder sein, so schlag ich Dir den Schdel ein meaning that if you do not see things my way (as a brother) I will break your skull. In short there is an element of the bully in the historiography of not a few of our colleagues. And no less a figure than Manning Clark himself decried the bullies among us..The concept of passionate coolness needs to be invoked here. That means we can feel passionately about an issue but are constrained by our political and religious culture to exercise restraint in dealing with points of view with which we do not necessarily agree with. The

Werbetext Was sagt uns Jena und Auerstedt 1806? Kurzbeschreibung Ob das Ende des Mittelalters oder die Erfindung des Sozialismus, Deutschland war im Gefolge geteilt und verwickelt in blutige Glaubensauseinandersetzungen und soziale ZerreiBprozesse. Sch. zeigt auf, wie die frhere Universitas, bis heute nicht wiedererlangt wurde. Weichenstellungen, wie am Vorabend der Franzsischen Revolution oder in der Epoche des Krimkrieges, bedingten die Schwchung Preuens 1806, und das Ende des Kaiserreiches 1918. Sch. legt nahe, dass eine Reform, wie zwischen 1807 und 1813, nicht mehr eintrat; so sei es zu dem "Zusammenbruch" 1945 und dem nur teilweisen Wiederaufbau nach 1949 (DDR/BRD) gekommen. Dessen Teilerfolg fhrte nach 1990 zu Krisenschben, die bis heute Deutschland geschwcht (einerseits souverän - andererseits ohne ausländische Kapitalhilfe) und unfhig zu tiefgreifender Innovation, zurckgelassen hten. Die Schwche Deutschlands beeintrchtige auch Europa, dessen Zukunftsfhigkeit von Sch. folgerichtig bezweifelt wird. Es handelt sich um ein Buch, das bereichert wird um Beitrge weiterer anerkannter Wissenschaftler. Klappentext Dass die deutsche Geschichte nicht von Gipfel zu Gipfel strmt, ist wohl jedem 1945 bewusst gewesen. Dass sich das Bewusstsein, eine gescheiterte Gromacht auf dem Weg zur Weltmacht gewesen zu sein, den Deutschen wieder abhanden kommt, ist uns heute präsent. Aber auch die brigen Mchte, aus denen sich die europische Union zusammensetzt, sind, mehr oder weniger, whrend der letzten Jahrhunderte abgestiegene Gro- und Weltmchte. SchlieBlich sorgt sich Sch. offenbar um die grassierende Staatsverdrossenheit in Deutschland heute und beginnt nicht zuletzt deshalb die Einleitung mit einem Memento an die Franzsische Revolution, deren Ursachen und Wirkungen in der Zeitspanne bis 1806. Schon die Einleitung zeichnet dezidiert den Weg Preuens (stellvertretend fr Deutschland) in die Niederlage von Jena und Auerstedt nach. So erscheint auch das Kaiserreich der Hohenzollern als Teil des Niederganges, der mit dem Ersten Weltkrieg zum entscheidenden Einbruch in der deutschen Geschichte fhrte. Der "Zusammenbruch" von 1945 bildete den erklrten Tiefpunkt dieser Entwicklung von den Glaubekriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts, ber den Dreißigjhrigen Krieg, bis hin zu den Kabinettskriegen...